Trump Administration''s ''Energy Dominance Return''
Opportunities and Risks for Korean Companies in LNG, Nuclear, Carbon Reduction Market Reorganization

As the US Department of Energy conducts a large-scale organizational restructuring to reactivate the Trump administration's energy dominance strategy, forecasts are emerging that it will have medium-to-long-term impacts on Korea's energy industry. This restructuring shows the US departing from climate/environment-centered policy to return to energy production, energy security, and industrial competitiveness-centered policy orientation.

Korea's LNG supply system is most likely to be affected first. The US is already one of Korea's largest LNG suppliers, and Trump administration expansion of shale gas and LNG production could positively affect Korea's long-term import contract stability — but changes in US domestic infrastructure investment priorities or export terminal approval uncertainties could also add uncertainty. LNG purchase potentially being used as a trade negotiation card with Korea (as in Trump's first term) cannot be ruled out.

In the nuclear sector, opportunities and risks coexist simultaneously. DOE strengthening nuclear security and nuclear weapons management capability means the US defines nuclear technology, SMR, and nuclear fuel policy as strategic industries. Korean SMR (K-SMR) and US company technology cooperation expansion possibilities open, while the US strengthening domestic nuclear company-centered market protectionism or tightening Korean SMR technology US entry requirements are also possible. US-Korea nuclear cooperation expansion may effectively require Korean companies to choose joint venture/co-development forms for market entry.

Renewable energy, hydrogen, and battery industries face relatively greater burdens. If DOE priorities reorganize around fossil and nuclear energy, subsidy scales for US solar, battery, and hydrogen projects may be adjusted — a significant risk management issue for Korean companies (Hanwha, LG Energy Solution, SK, etc.) that have made large-scale US investments post-IRA. Core mineral supply chains for EVs/batteries are likely to continue receiving support for national security reasons, maintaining opportunity in some areas.

Ultimately this DOE restructuring is a signal demanding "selection and concentration" strategic decisions across Korea's energy industry — simultaneously securing new opportunities in nuclear, core minerals, and battery fields in US cooperation, while minimizing uncertainties related to renewables, hydrogen, and trade negotiations.